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29 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Doctor Halprin, International Security Agency 27 and 29 January 1968

- 1. This memorandum is for information only.
- 2. At the request of DD/S&T, I attended a meeting with Doctor Halprin Saturday morning at 10:00 in the Pentagon. Meeting was between Doctor Halprin and myself.
- 3. Doctor Halprin's questions were rather basic. He opened his remarks by stating that he had been charged with formulating some ideas for Secretary Warnke's office on the subject of a possible bombing standdown in North Vietnam. He had a fair knowledge of the principal operational aspects of BLACK SHIELD; however, he did ask "Under ideal conditions, how much of North Vietnam could be covered on a single mission". He also asked among other questions whether BLACK SHIELD could be used in a tactical situation and whether I thought BLACK SHIELD photography would be good insurance for determining whether the VC and North Vietnamese were staging a significant build-up in any area during the period of the standdown. I told him that under certain circumstances that I thought it could; however, BLACK SHIELD by itself, even augmented with COMINT, would not guarantee the detection of such a build-up.
- 4. He then explained to me that the policy makers were concerned that if we used any vehicle other than BLACK SHIELD, any negotiations that were in progress might even be ruptured should we attempt to employ low-level manned reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam during the standdown period. In addition, the loss of a drone over North Vietnam during this period might prove equally embarrassing.

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5. Doctor Halprin asked me to stop in on the way to the office Monday morning in the event he had any further questions. I did meet Doctor Halprin Monday morning and he noted that he had since discussed this problem with DIA. DIA felt that BLACK SHIELD could play the tactical role discussed earlier; however, he also noted that DIA said the JCS would not concur in the sole use of BLACK SHIELD during the standdown. The meeting Monday morning was brief in that Doctor Halprin had turned the whole problem over to the JCS and admitted he was now involved in several other problems. He thanked me for my assistance and I departed the Pentagon for the Headquarters building.

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_	Executive Officer
	Office of Special Activities
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